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Abstract: Starting from the E-Navigation concept of IMO this 
paper will give an overview about integrity in maritime traffic 
awareness. Derived from a DLR study a concept is presented 
which introduces the provision of integrity maritime traffic 
awareness. This is based on common techniques like Automatic 
Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) and Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) and a PNT-Unit which gives ship position, navigation, and 






One of the main objectives of the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) is the safe, secure and efficient realisation of all processes inside the 
Global Maritime Traffic System. Therefore IMO has initiated the E-Navigation 
strategy to use all available electronic methods of situation assessment, all 
channels of information exchange on vessel-to-vessel and vessel-to-shore levels, 
and to merge them into vessel steering and traffic management processes to 
improve safety at sea. It is particularly important due to the vessel traffic volume 
being on the increase. On the other hand, E-Navigation is an important concept 
of developing a global model of data exchange and defining areas of 
responsibility for the maritime traffic system. 
One of the core elements of improving the safety of vessel traffic is the 
implementation of integrity monitoring of all sensors and services with special 
focus on data processing methods and communication channels being used 
aboard and ashore [IMO-NAV54/25]. 
The idea of integrity has already been utilised in the world of global 
navigation satellite systems (GNSS) and now it is also being established in the 
area of maritime traffic systems. In order to incorporate the idea of integrity into 
the whole maritime technology system, two independent schemes may be 
considered. 
First one is a bottom-up approach. Hereby, the integrity of every single 
sensor and parameter is applied, using dedicated integrity monitoring procedures 
and integrity models. The basis of the integrity monitoring is a measurement 
redundancy. If two or more independent measurement methods can be used, 
their results can then be compared and they should be the same within specified 
tolerance. The integrity models are defined by a parametric description of all 
partial errors encountered during a measurement and an assessment of an overall 
error in respect to error interactions. The parameters of the integrity model can 
be determined by measurements and can help adapt the model to the real 
situation. If the integrity of the parameters and its monitoring is completely 
provided, it can be implemented in high-level systems. 
The second scheme is a top-down approach. This requires a high-level 
definition and implementation of the “integrity” term throughout the whole 
maritime traffic system. The definition can be based on a mathematically 
parameterized model, which is able to figure out whether a vessel is in a safe 
condition. The parameters can be obtained e.g. from the traffic situation, 
waterway specifics, vessel type and navigational status. The model of safety 
level of a vessel can be determined statically or dynamically. In former case, the 
attention is focused on modelling of a transition from one safe state to the other 
safe state of every vessel in a traffic area. In latter case, at any moment the safe 
state of a vessel has to be guaranteed by the model. The whole maritime traffic is 
then declared safe, when all the participating vessels are classified as safe. The 
classification based on an integrity model helps define the integrity requirements 
for systems, services, on both sensor and algorithm levels. 
In this paper the former described bottom-up approach is used to find gaps 
in the current set of used sensors and methods related to data and system 
integrity. An approach for a traffic situation assessment which overcomes 
current shortcomings is presented.  
 
2. What Is Integrity? 
  
According to International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International 
Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA), 
the integrity is the ability to provide users with warnings within a specified time 
when the system should not be used for navigation [IMO-A.915(22)-Annex 1 & 
IALA-R-121]. Specific integrity parameters are already defined in 
[IMO-A.915(22)] as revised maritime Policy and Requirements for a future 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS): the threshold value or alert limit, 
the time to alarm and the integrity risk. Furthermore, one has to distinguish 
between integrity and integrity monitoring, whereby integrity monitoring can be 
described as the implementation of integrity. It is the process of determining, 
whether the system performance (or individual observations) is sufficient for 
navigation purposes. The output of integrity monitoring tells the users that either 
individual (erroneous) observations or the overall GNSS system can not be used 
for navigation. 
In order to describe the reliability of several parameters or a whole system, 
it is necessary to specify the performance requirements of those elements. The 
properties of performance and quality are based on a function, which should be 
performed, and a target, that is to be reached. An example of the vessel-based 
function is a permanent determination of its position, which is primarily done by 
the on-board sensors. In that case, their performance and quality description 
states, how frequent and how precise the position should be provided to the crew 
aboard. 
The baseline of quality and performance description is their existing 
specification of global navigation satellite systems and the augmentation 
services provided to maritime users because their wide usage aboard vessels has 
led to a very active development in that area. 
One of the performance and quality descriptors is the data integrity. In order 
to support the process of decision making on board, it is necessary to have a 
complete view of the traffic situation, based on all available parameters. In case 
of manoeuvres critical to safety, like collision avoidance, it is important to know 
the percentage of truth contained within the values of the parameters. To know 
the level of that consistency, the sensors also need to have the capability of 
determining the current error followed by the usefulness of a given sensor or a 
multi-sensor system. This can be done in reference to the accuracy requirements, 
which help decide on whether to use the data for navigation. 
 
3. State of the art Integrity Approaches for Sensors  
 
The integrity can be monitored either internally or externally. The former 
one is performed on board a vessel, whereas the latter one is provided by 
services outside. One of the most used sensors serving as a position source 
aboard is the GNSS receiver, usually operating with GPS constellation. If the 
number of available satellites is sufficient, it is possible to use an internal RAIM 
(Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring) algorithm to identify, if a specific 
signal is induced by errors, and if yes, to exclude them from the position 
calculations. This process can be considered as a single sensor specific internal 
integrity monitoring. 
If more than one GNSS receiver or other additional independent positioning 
equipment is available on board, redundancy and backup functionalities are 
created. Using input from multiple sensors, it is possible to implement more 
complex algorithms to compute the position and compare the results of the 
different sensors. So the performance of each sensor can be observed by another 
sensor. This process is also regarded as multi-sensor internal integrity 
monitoring.  
The utilization of differential ground based augmentation system following 
IALA standard is an example for external integrity monitoring. Here satellite 
signals are proven related to reachable accuracy and augmented information 
including integrity information is provided to the user aboard. 
In case no GNSS sensors, devices or systems aboard, their basic function is 
to output data like measurements, information or steering signals. The output 
data is generated as a result of measurements or a processing of input data from 
other sources. For example, an AIS device (Automatic Identification System) on 
board is expected to deliver dynamic, static and voyage-related data, which is 
complete and depicts the real situation around a vessel. It is, however, unclear at 
any given moment, whether that basic set of functions inside an AIS device is 
working correctly and feeding the other devices with proper data. It is possible 
to apply different techniques to ensure a satisfactory performance of the basic 
functions. 
First, an error model can be applied to control the output data and compare 
them with a nominal error distribution. If the error model verifies that the data 
has a required quality, the sensor generating the data is allowed to be used. In 
case of mission critical systems, the error model is checked during 
homologation. Nonetheless, this method cannot ensure data integrity according 
to the integrity definition mentioned above. 
There are two reasons. On one hand, a change or interference in usage 
conditions of a device may increase error rate and exceed the nominal error 
margins. On the other hand, the error rate could be influenced by a device 
malfunction or simple system ageing. In order to narrow the error margin, the 
systems undergo regular checkups, during which the error models can be tuned. 
However, it is not possible to warn a user within a specified time (near real 
time), that the system is not working within the accepted error level defined by 
specifications and requirements. 
Second, a core system can be equipped with an integrity check function and 
it is then expected to survey its own performance operations and data output, and 
to compare them with the requirements. In order to accomplish that, two 
standard aspects of data quality can be tested: plausibility and consistency. 
A check of data plausibility is based on threshold values and ranges. The 
data stops being plausible, as soon as the output values violate those predefined 
limits and the sensor is no longer reasonable or worthy of belief. For example, a 
positioning device on board a vessel outputs a point (0, 0, 0) in CCS and because 
the vessel cannot be in the center of the Earth, the position is implausible. 
Similar case of plausibility loss would happen, if an AIS transponder of a vessel 
transmitted an extremely high value of speed over ground, which could never be 
reached ship-borne. Those tests of plausibility are helpful, but cannot indicate 
data errors, which are hidden below the reasonable limits. 
In case of a consistency check, the data quality is analysed in respect to its 
continuance and coherence. The data has to have a specified emplacement in 
space and time. In order to decide, whether the data is consistent, the default 
value ranges are to be known. For instance, a vessel receives an AIS position of 
another craft. The calculated distance to the AIS transmission source is larger 
than the horizontal range of radio waves on marine frequencies. If the AIS data 
packet does not have a nonzero repeat indicator, the received position is 
inconsistent. Another example of data inconsistency could be a sudden change 
of sensor output values. If the AIS data is updated once per two seconds and the 
vessel is underway using engine, a single jump of position point faraway from 
her currently reported position, which is physically impossible to occur, could 
indicate a loss of data consistency. 
 
4. GAP Analyses  
 
A gap analysis is considered to be an important part in the strategy of 
E-Navigation. It identifies gaps between the optimized allocation and integration 
of the inputs, and the current allocation level. This can help to reveal areas that 
can be improved. That way, a review of existing technologies and systems, and 
the evaluation of their performance can measure their capability of meeting the 
requirements of users. The development of marine traffic systems can then 
continue towards countering the deficiencies identified during the gap 
evaluation. The process of finding gaps can also define a path of transition 
towards a quality level, which is desired by the users. 
The essential document on the gap analysis was created by IMO [IMO-
NAV53/13-Annex3]. Its authors analysed from different angles the elements that 
make up a mariner’s life: nautical charts, bridge operations, shore systems, 
communication channels, data storage, crew management, equipment on board, 
aids to navigation, decision support and collision avoidance systems. Each area 
of interest was examined in three categories: the current status, how it is going to 
look like under the auspices of the E-Navigation ideology, and what aspects 
have to undergo change or adaptation. The work on the document is still in 
progress by IMO and IALA. 
There are four different approaches used to set up a gap analysis [IMO-
NAV56/8]. The operational analysis presents a limited concept of E-Navigation, 
which is based on currently available systems and technologies. The technical 
analysis, on the other hand, compares the systems being used nowadays with the 
requirements derived directly from the user needs, in order to define a path for 
system development. The aim of the regulative analysis is to identify the 
weaknesses of current performance demands on institutional levels. A provision 
of maritime services outside territorial waters and its responsibility could be the 
example of that. Finally, the training-related analysis focuses on minimal 
requirements needed to teach the users to handle the new navigational tools 
implemented by the E-Navigation rules. 
Concentrating on data and system integrity, which is one high-level user 
need [IMO-NAV54/25-Annex12], DLR has done its own gap analysis, which 
can be treated as technical analysis in the IMO classification. It focuses on 
research, what conceptual definitions, standards, sensors and methods are 
currently available, and which of them can deliver integrity information about 
parameters that describe a traffic situation. The main results of the Gap analysis 
can be summarized as following:  
- missing consistent performance standards concerning accuracy and 
integrity for all measured and derived parameters (position, SOG, ROT 
etc.) 
- missing methods (services) for external integrity monitoring for AIS 
data 
- missing standards for the transmission of integrity information from 
shore based services to the vessels    
- insufficient resolution of nautical charts in critical areas (e.g. harbour) 
 
5. First concept Of An integrity Demonstrator for maritime Traffic 
awareness 
  
One of the essential steps towards implementation of the integrity concept 
is the creation of a demonstrator. It is necessary to have a base system, which 
can visualise the new ideas and concepts of E-Navigation and, particularly, that 
of integrity. The starting point of building the demonstrator system is a 
collection of user requirements within E-Navigation and their references to the 
current gaps between supply and demand of the integrity coverage within the 
nautical systems. 
The demonstrator system brings together such fields of expertise like 
complete position estimation in a traffic area, decision support, time 
synchronisation, data integrity check and augmentation functions. The need to 
deal with the above subjects is especially evident, when it comes to mission 
critical operations. Using the demonstration platform it is possible to show, by 
means of specified performance parameters, the value-added aspects of proposed 
technical innovations, which can later define new standards and be passed to the 
industry. 
The design of the demonstration system is modular and consists of separate 
sub-demonstrators, which are interconnected and can exchange data. Each sub-
demonstrator is responsible for one of the three domains: traffic situation 
assessment, PNT, and augmentation. It is important to select an appropriate set 
of sensors and to define, how they will feed the demonstrator systems with data. 
Afterwards, it is necessary to design the internal interfaces, which will be used to 
exchange data between the sub-demonstrators. 
The basic functions of the sub-demonstrator responsible for traffic 
assessment are: data processing, linkage of the traffic participants, evaluation of 
the traffic situation, and finally a presentation of data and results. As far as the 
system architecture is concerned, the traffic estimate can be either vessel-based 
or shore-based. 
In case of the traffic evaluation on board a vessel (Fehler! Verweisquelle 
konnte nicht gefunden werden.), the basic sources of information are the 
relations between the vessel and other ship-borne objects in her surroundings. 
The situation around the vessel is derived from the standard parameters like 
relative or absolute position, speed over ground, course over ground, heading, 
rate of turn, and navigational status. The navigator on board the vessel can 
determine her movements, based on the output data from their own PNT device. 
The sources of information on other vessels are radar and AIS. Since the 
SOLAS convention requires AIS to be fitted aboard international voyaging ships 
with gross tonnage of 300 or more tons, and all passenger ships regardless of 
size, the availability of AIS data on major shipping routes is substantial. The AIS 
channel can also be used to obtain auxiliary nautical information and warnings 
from the VTS centers. Furthermore, an electronic nautical chart (ENC) together 
with its database of aids to navigation will be used within an ECDIS (Electronic 
Chart Display and Information System) to visualise the traffic situation. 
 
 
Fig. 1. First concept of vessel-based traffic situation assessment demonstrator. 
 
The shore-based traffic evaluation, on the other hand, has a similar 
arrangement of the components (Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden 
werden.). Small differences may be noticed in the way how sensors and data 
sources are used. However, more important is the alternate approach to the 
traffic situation assessment. Every maritime vessel within a specified traffic area 
has to be analysed in correspondence with the other traffic participants in the 
vicinity. It creates a higher level of complexity during the evaluation process. 
 
 
Fig. 2. First concept of shore-based traffic situation assessment demonstrator. 
 
For example, it would be necessary to spot all possible situations of close 
encounter between any group of vessels, which could lead to a collision. In 
similar case, a VTS center coordinates the traffic within its area of responsibility 
and has to plan when and where the vessels on the waterway can pass one 
another safely. And this involves calculations of the estimated time of arrival at 
specified sidings for all the parties. 
The sub-demonstrator, as shown in Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht 
gefunden werden. and Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden 
werden., consists of separate processing blocks. At first, the data are received 
from various sensors and taken into the preparation chain. To make sure that the 
data were transferred without interference, a cyclic redundancy checksum (CRC) 
is generated and, when compared, it has to be equal to the origin CRC. 
Next, the data have to be decoded. In most cases the standard in use is 
NMEA, which stores comma separated values in ASCII sentences. The values 
simply have to be extracted and broken down into variables. It is also important 
to have a unified time synchronisation of all data sources. GPS is nowadays the 
most common time reference. Nevertheless, not every NMEA sentence has a 
time stamp and that poses a big challenge for future development of marine 
equipment, as well as for usage of existing data inside the demonstrator system. 
After the first processing phase is completed, the data are passed to the 
acquisition block, in which a process of conjoining takes place. Apart from 
checking the data flags and statuses, the data undergoes validity and plausibility 
checks. This is where the reference database is deployed. It contains threshold 
values related to the input data categories, for example the maximum speed of 
the vessel, and it can help determine whether the data is plausible. Parallel to 
that, plausibility of the time series is diagnosed. It can distinguish sudden and 
irrational changes of data values as compared to the previous ones. For instance, 
if a vessel is going steady and at one point her position jumps faraway just to 
return to its previous track a moment later, this location change could be 
considered a loss of plausibility, because it would be technically impossible. 
During transformation, the data containing spatial information has to be 
transformed in order to conform to the so-called consistent common reference 
point. It is the base of all measurements on board a vessel, and is usually located 
on the bridge at the conning station. The collection of functions responsible for 
the data fusion and the integrity check is where the actual conjoining takes place. 
The acquired targets are associated with one another. Depending on the number 
of data sources, it is possible to apply different processing options. In case of a 
single data stream describing the traffic objects, the state of the data integrity 
cannot be fully determined. However, if more data sources are available, they 
can be transformed and compared. For example, the AIS data of a vessel, which 
contains her geographic position, speed and course, can be matched with the 
same set of parameters calculated by ARPA. Both data sources can then be 
combined, producing a certain degree of integrity evaluation. 
Finally, after the traffic object data is collected and stored, the evaluation of 
the traffic situation can be initiated. Special attention is laid to the levels of 
uncertainty related to the vessel movements. For example, the precision of the 
position and its reliability can be analysed and compared against the 
parameterised requirements. The idea is to assess dangerous situations, which 
can lead to collisions or grounding within the current traffic environment. 
Another part of the evaluation process is the forecast of the traffic situation. 
The prediction subroutines are based on a specified future time intervals. The 
projected movements of the vessels are examined in respect to possible unsafe 
close approaches. The influence of data uncertainty on forecasting is also taken 
into consideration. In case of dangerous situations requiring a seafarer’s 
reaction, special alarm and warning management system is introduced. It can 
report problems with unreliable input data received from the sensors, as well as 
warn against the violation of safety levels, when the vessels are on collision 
course or too close to one another. 
With these sub-demonstrators determined integrity information about all 
presented data of single sensors and complex systems will help decision making 
in complex situation because of proven and reliable information. 
 
Summary and Conclusions  
 
IMO initiated user survey on marine user needs identified data and system 
integrity as one of eight important generic high-level user need. Our technical 
gap analysis shows shortcomings in the current definition of alert limits, times to 
alarm and integrity risk for a plenty of sensors and systems in marine use. For 
this reason an overall traffic situation assessment including integrity is not 
feasible in time. An approach based on sensor fusion and use of measurement 
redundancy show in bottom-up way the propagation of integrity of single 
sensors to complex system like traffic situation assessment to fulfil the E-
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